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Abstract 
Over the past twenty years, imports to the U.S. from low-wage countries have increased 
dramatically. In this paper we examine how low-wage country import competition in the U.S. 
influences the probability of manufacturing establishment closure. Confidential data from the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census are used to track all manufacturing establishments between 1992 and 
2007. These data are linked to measures of import competition built from individual trade 
transactions. Controlling for a variety of plant and firm covariates, we show that low-wage 
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Plant Exit and U.S. Imports from Low-Wage Countries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Between 1992 and 2007, U.S. imports increased by a factor of 2.5, climbing above the $2 trillion 
mark. Over the same period, imports to the United States from low-wage countries grew by a 
factor of almost 10. Increased global economic integration holds the potential to dramatically 
change labor market dynamics and industry structure in both developed and developing countries 
(Baldwin 2006; Blinder 2006; Autor et al. 2012). Recent evidence from advanced industrialized 
economies such as the United States confirms this intuition: workers in these countries have been 
affected by rising imports in various ways (Kletzer 2002; Ebenstein et al. 2009). Potential 
impacts are likely to be largest in relation to trade among economies whose factor endowments 
are fundamentally different, such as between economies that have an abundance of low-skill 
labor and those that are abundant in highly-skilled workers (Feenstra 2008). Following this logic, 
researchers have found that import competition from low-wage economies like China is 
associated with a variety of negative labor market effects in developed economies, from job loss, 
to increases in government transfers, and reduced long-run earnings (Pierce and Schott, 2012; 
Autor et al. 2013; Kemeny et al. 2015). In keeping with the recent growth of low-wage imports, 
estimates of these impacts over the 1990s and 2000s are far larger than those documented by 
researchers looking for trade effects in  the 1980s (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993; Berman et al. 
1994; Sachs and Schatz 1994).  
 
One way that import competition can affect workers is by inducing the establishments in which 
they work to shut down, or ‘exit’ (Bernard et al. 2006; Eriksson et al. 2009; Inui et al. 2009; 
Colantone & Sleuwaegen 2010; Baldwin and Yan 2011; Wagner 2011; Colantone et al. 2014). 
Although this relationship has received considerable attention, to date the models that link import 
competition and plant exit rarely control for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant/firm level. 
This is an important omission. It is reasonable to assume that a variable such as managerial 
expertise is effectively fixed over short time-periods within plants/firms and that this variable 
will be correlated with most measures of plant/firm performance. Resulting estimates using 
pooled, independent cross-sections will thus be biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge 2002). We 
remedy this concern using a three period variant of the traditional fixed effects panel model. The 
paper also adds value by updating the earlier findings of Bernard et al. (2006) and Bernard and 
Jensen (2007) for the United States, and by extending the analysis to consider a number of 
interactions between import competition and plant/firm characteristics for the U.S. economy. 
 
Consistent with past results, notably the findings of Bernard et al. (2006), we find that rising 
import competition from low-wage economies increases the probability of manufacturing plant-
exit. Industry-specific import competition from high wage countries also increases the likelihood 
of exit, though the size of the effect is much smaller than competition from low-wage countries. 
Several factors act to insulate plants and protect against exit. Larger plants, older plants and 
those that export have lower probabilities of exit. In line with Bloom et al. (2011), we find 
evidence that higher productivity plants, those with higher levels of capital investment per 
worker and those with higher ratios of capital investment devoted to computing equipment, a 
proxy for technology, are less likely to exit markets when the intensity of low-wage import 
 3 
competition increases. Like Bernard and Jensen (2007) we report that imports from low-wage 
countries are more likely to push plants that are part of multi-establishment firms to exit relative 
to single-plant firms. However, we also show that the plants of firms that have foreign affiliates 
in low-wage countries are less likely to exit than plants overall. Additional evidence of the 
protective nature of plant-level productivity within multi-unit firms is found, and new 
information about how low-wage country import competition interacts with other plant-level and 
firm-level characteristics is presented. Results are obtained from linear probability models in 
fixed effects panel form and from panel models incorporating instrumental variables. 
 
The paper is organized in five sections below. In Section 2, the recent theoretical and empirical 
literature that underpins our analysis is briefly discussed. Section 3 outlines the linked data sets 
that we have employed. Section 4 presents the analytical approach. In Section 5 the main results 
of the analysis are detailed and a short conclusion is offered in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Overview 
 
There is growing evidence of firm heterogeneity with respect to trade (Aw and Hwang 1995; 
Clerides et al. 1998; Bernard and Jensen 1999). Persistent intra-industry differences in plant and 
firm performance, differences correlated with export status, are inconsistent with Krugman’s 
new trade theory and its assumption that all firms export. A so-called “new new” trade theory 
emerged with the work of Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). At the 
core of these new theoretical models of trade is firm heterogeneity and an assumption that the 
sunk-costs of entry into export markets can be borne only by more productive businesses. 
Though these models generally assume the market structure that they seek to explain, the 
relationships between firm characteristics, trade and market dynamics that they outline have 
become standard tools for exploring competition in an increasingly integrated global economy. 
 
For Melitz (2003), entrants to an industry are identical and heterogeneity is generated through a 
random productivity draw that follows payment of fixed entry costs encouraged, in turn, by the 
possibility of profit.  This productivity draw is consistent with the idea that firms do not know 
their productivity until they enter the market and begin production. An additional fixed cost to 
enter export markets partitions firms into exporters or non-exporters depending on their 
productivity levels. In this fashion, the positive correlation between exporter status and firm 
productivity is captured. Melitz (2003) shows that trade-based competition lowers the revenues 
of non-exporting firms as foreign exporters are on average larger and more efficient. 
Consequently, the least efficient non-exporters may be forced to exit the industry. At the same 
time, more efficient firms that export gain market-share and capture additional profit. 
 
Bernard et al. (2003) offer a model of production and trade under imperfect competition. By 
allowing differential plant mark-ups, variations in efficiency give rise to heterogeneity in 
measures of plant-level productivity, consistent with available data. As in Melitz (2003) initial 
levels of plant efficiency are established as a random drawn from an efficiency distribution. 
Assuming that the costs of overcoming trade barriers prevent less efficient plants from exporting, 
Bernard et al. (2003) establish the positive relationship between plant-level productivity and 
export behavior. Variable costs and market-size structure the intensity of competition and firm 
dynamics in this model. Helpman et al. (2004) extend similar arguments about firm 
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heterogeneity, productivity and the costs of serving foreign markets to examine the decision to 
export or to engage in foreign direct investment. Assuming the fixed costs of FDI exceed those 
of exporting, they show that only the most productive subset of firms with an international 
presence invest in a foreign production facility and that decision is made in terms of market 
access. Head and Ries (2003) provide additional arguments motivating FDI choice. Antras and 
Helpman (2004) and Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) develop these claims further, exploring 
how incomplete contracting can help explain the organizational choices of firms that trade. 
Further extensions of these arguments explore the distribution of exports across countries (Eaton 
et al. 2008), provide a framework for understanding the scope of heterogeneous firms with 
respect to the variety of products exported and the choice of export markets (Bernard et al. 
2011), and investigate the decision to integrate or outsource production in domestic or 
international settings. 
 
These theoretical claims undergird a rapidly expanding empirical literature that highlights firm 
heterogeneity in relation to international trade. Much of the work is concerned with exports and 
entry, specifically seeking to understand whether entry into exporting confers productivity 
advantages upon the exporters; the counterfactual is that only the most productive firms select 
into exporting activity. Wagner (2007) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) provide detailed 
surveys of this literature. Links between imports and entry and exit are less well developed. 
However, recent papers point to a positive link between import status and firm performance that 
echo findings on the export side (Amiti and Konings 2007; Castellani et al. 2010). Causality is 
likewise still an issue, though there is a large body of work that suggests firms importing 
intermediate inputs, whether at arms-length or as a result of offshoring, enjoy significant 
productivity advantages (Vogel and Wagner 2010; Bas and Strauss-Kahn 2014).  
 
An even smaller body of work links imports to plant exit, taking well-known plant-exit 
arguments (see Dunne et al. 1989; Baldwin and Gorecki 1998) and grafting onto these models 
measures of trade-related characteristics at either the plant, firm or industry levels. Across a 
number of emerging economies, the focus has been directed at trade liberalization, increased 
foreign competition and the reallocation of resources across producers within industrial sectors. 
Thus, Pavcnik (2002) explores the impact of trade liberalization through the 1970s and early 
1980s in Chile. Controlling for plant characteristics, she reveals that the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers and significant reductions in tariffs were associated with marked productivity gains 
within industries: those gains won, at least in part, by the elimination of less-efficient plants. 
Alvarez and Vergara (2010) update results from Chile, examining trade policy reforms up to 
2000. They show that liberalization increases plant exit in smaller and less-efficient plants, 
especially plants in export-oriented sectors. Amiti and Konings (2007) report the exit of less 
efficient firms in their analysis of tariff cuts for both intermediate inputs and final goods in 
Indonesia. Eslava et al. (2013) show that trade liberalization in Colombia tightens markets and 
the resultant intensification of competition is more likely to increase exit for less productive 
plants. Results from analysis of tariff reductions and plant exit from more developed economies 
are broadly similar. Lileeva (2008) shows that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement induced a 
significant shift in exit rates among non-exporting Canadian manufacturing plants. Baldwin and 
Yan (2011) report similar findings though results from New Zealand are somewhat more mixed 
(Gibson and Harris 1996). 
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Within advanced industrial economies, more generally, examination of the impacts of trade on 
plant exit have tended to focus on rising import competition rather than shifts in tariffs. The 
sharp rise in import competition tends to be viewed as a reflection of the growth of 
industrializing economies and the associated rise in offshoring,  manifest through both arms-
length and multinational subsidiary arrangements. In a seminal paper, Bernard et al. (2006) show 
that rates of exit among U.S. manufacturing plants are higher in industries characterized by 
greater import competition from low-wage countries. Similar results are presented for Belgian 
firms by Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008), and Greenaway et al. (2008) show that exit rates for 
Swedish plants are also higher in industries facing more severe import competition from non-
OECD nations. However, in their survey of Belgian plants, Mion and Zhu (2013) report no 
relationship between firm survival and import competition. Likewise, Inui et al. (2009) find no 
significant effect of import competition on plant exit in Japan. In an interesting South-South 
comparison, Alvarez and Claro (2009) show that that the probability of exit is higher for Chilean 
plants confronting a steep increase in import competition originating from China. 
 
While import competition, especially from low-wage countries is generally seen as a driver of 
plant exit, a new series of studies complicate the links between globalization and firm survival. 
Thus, plants that export are typically found to be less susceptible to exit than those that do not 
export (Esteve-Perez et al. 2008; Greenaway et al. 2008; Gorg and Spaliara 2010). In a different 
twist, Lopez (2006) shows that plants that import intermediate inputs have a higher probability of 
survival. This, in turn, might be related to the product-upgrading induced by low-wage import 
competition discussed by Bernard et al. (2006). Considerable evidence suggests that firms with 
different productivity premia self-select into different types of engagements with the global 
economy, ranging from arms-length importing and exporting of intermediates and final goods, 
through to offshoring to wholly-owned affiliates. Many of these choices are linked to plant and 
firm survival. Looking at some of these broader firm characteristics, Bernard and Jensen (2007) 
show that the plants of multi-unit and multi-national firms are more likely to exit than their 
single-establishment firm counterparts. Bandick (2010) illustrates the complex relationships 
between firm survival, multi-national status and foreign/domestic ownership in Sweden. Bloom 
et al. (2011) explore the influence of Chinese import competition on European firms. They show 
that low-wage import competition induces technological upgrading and that improved 
technology insulates some firms from job-loss and higher probabilities of failure. 
 
To date, almost all the literature on plant-exit and trade follows the general structure of the 
model laid out by Bernard et al. (2006). This is essentially a cross-sectional design, taking plant- 
and firm-characteristics at time t and exploring their relation with plant exit at some future time 
t+n. One important weakness of such an approach is the inability to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the plant level. We address this issue by estimating panel models of exit that 
explicitly deal with stationary forms of unobserved heterogeneity within manufacturing 
establishments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the relationship 
between import competition and plant exit in the United States controlling explicitly for 
plant/firm-level fixed effects. We also extend the standard plant-level accounts to examine a 
number of firm characteristics and their relationship to exit. We turn to the data in the next 
section. 
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3. Data 
 
3.1 Sources 
 
Investigating the impacts of trade on the probability of manufacturing plant exit in the U.S. 
economy requires import and export data along with measures of the characteristics of 
manufacturing establishments (plant and firm level data). These data are readily available from 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census through the Federal Statistical Research Data Center network. The 
trade data originate in the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. The aggregated, 
public data on U.S. imports and exports are built up from individual import and export 
declarations submitted to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service. These individual 
records are available annually for the period 1992-2007 and cover all import declarations 
exceeding $2000 in value ($250 for certain quota items). Import declarations for shipments less 
than $2000 in value are imputed. The individual import declarations contain information on the 
principal party of interest, the name and address of the business that is the major beneficiary of 
the traded commodities, and which is typically the importer of the products detailed in the 
declaration. The trade declarations also provide Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) that 
help identify the importer of record. Shipper’s Export Declarations (SED) cover all export 
bundles exceeding $2500 in value ($250 for certain quota items). The SED data record the 
country to which the exports are being shipped, a 10-digit product code consistent with the 
Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, a NAICS code, the physical quantity 
of a product shipped along with its value, and identifying information on the firm that exports 
(the EIN). From 1990, the SED is not required in the case of exports to Canada. Statistics Canada 
generates data on imports from the U.S. that are used by the Census to construct exports to 
Canada. 
 
Imports and exports are classified using either Schedule B commodity codes or commodity 
codes of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. The first six-digits of both these schemes are 
consistent and can be liked to SIC/NAICs codes using concordances of the Census Bureau 
(,www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ reference/codes) or of the United States International Trade 
Commission. These concordances allow translation of import/export commodity groups into the 
industry categories of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). We use the transaction level trade data and make use of 
NAICS in the analysis below. 
 
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Bureau of the Census contains the 
universe of all U.S. business establishments with paid employment. The LBD contains names 
and address information, employer identification numbers and wage and employment data for all 
establishments. The LBD includes data for manufacturing and non-manufacturing businesses 
such as the age of plants, as well as information on the individual establishments that comprise 
multi-unit firms. Unfortunately, the LBD does not contain a great deal of information on the 
characteristics of individual business establishments beyond basic identifiers and overall 
employment data. A much broader list of establishment characteristics for manufacturing plants 
is available from the Census of Manufactures (CM) for all years ending either in a 2 or 7. CM 
data are utilized for the years 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 for this study of manufacturing plant 
exit. The CM contains valuable information on plant-level inputs and outputs, including value 
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added, production and non-production employment, capital stocks, overall capital investment, 
the share of that investment devoted to computers and machinery, and estimates of total factor 
productivity. The manufacturing plant-level data can be linked to the LBD, to firms and thus to 
the trade data discussed above through EINs and other plant-firm identifiers (see Bernard et al. 
1995). Analysis of the impacts of trade from low-wage countries on plant exit is limited to the 
manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy. In large part this reflects the paucity of trade data for 
other parts of the economy. 
 
3.2 Measures of Trade Competition 
 
To gauge the impact of trade on U.S. labor markets and on plant exit requires a measure of trade-
based competition. A relatively standard measure of import competition indicates the extent to 
which imports comprise the overall value of a product available for U.S. domestic consumption. 
That measure is adopted here, limiting the import term in the numerator to the merchandise that 
originates in low-wage countries 
 
 
ititit
it
it IMPORTSEXPORTSSHIPMENTS
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+−
=
__
__  (1) 
 
where i indexes product type or industry and t indexes the year. 
 
The subset of low-wage countries is identified by the World Bank on the basis of GDP per capita 
data for the year 1992, the first year of analysis. The set of low-wage countries is fixed over the 
years examined. The World Bank classifies economies into one of four broad groups: low 
income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income. Low-wage countries in 
1992 were defined as those economies with average annual gross national income below (U.S.) 
$545. Table 1 lists the 51 countries that comprise this grouping. Note that this group includes 
relatively large economies that export high volumes of output to the United States such as China 
and India. Across Latin America and the Caribbean, the only countries that are part of the low-
wage group are Guyana, Haiti and Honduras. World Bank lists of low-wage countries are quite 
broadly employed in the trade and development literature (see Arvis et al. 2016; Autor et al. 
2012; Djankov 2010; Easterly 2005; Freund, 2009), though note that membership on these lists 
varies by year. The list of low-wage countries employed in this paper is slightly different from 
that employed by Bernard et al. (2006), though both lists include China. To the extent that the 
rise of U.S. imports from low-wage economies since 1990 is dominated by China (Autor et al. 
2012; Rigby et al. 2014), the differences in the low-wage country groupings are of little 
significance. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
U.S. import competition overall increased from 16.7% to 24.8% over the period 1992-2007. 
Over the same period, import competition from low-wage countries increased considerably faster 
(Rigby et al. 2014). Indeed, Autor et al. (2012) note that China alone was responsible for more 
than 90% of all growth in imports to the United States from low-wage countries between 2000 
and 2007. Table 2 reports values of low-wage import competition for individual 3-digit NAICs 
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sectors. In general, relatively low-skill, labor intensive sectors such as textile products, apparel 
and leather goods production have experienced the highest levels of low-wage import 
competition, though other industries with significant components of low-skill assembly 
activities, such as computer and electronics and electrical equipment manufacture as well as 
furniture production also compete in markets that are contested by low-wage countries. It is 
important to note that imports include the flow of goods from foreign affiliates of U.S. multi-
national corporations. Such imports are identified in the transaction-level trade data as flows 
between “related parties”. 
 
Manufacturing plant data from the Census of Manufactures in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 are 
linked to measures of import competition for the same years. The import competition measures 
are defined at the 6-digit level of the NAICS classification, covering around 350 different 
manufacturing industries. Manufacturing plants are allocated to those same industrial sectors 
based on the composition of plant output by product. Plants are placed in the specific NAICS 
class that comprises the majority share of the plant’s total value of output. Plant deaths or exits 
are captured when individual establishment identifiers disappear from the Longitudinal Business 
Database. Exits track real plant closures rather than changes of ownership. 
 
By convention, the analytical samples exclude administrative record plants. These are relatively 
small, single-plant firms for which considerable data are imputed. Unlike Bernard et al. (2006), 
we do not drop NAICS sectors listed as “not elsewhere classified”. These sectors typically 
contain miscellaneous plants that are not readily placed in other industrial classes. These NAICS 
classes are sometimes dropped because they prevent logit models from converging. This is not a 
problem in our models and our preference is to include all possible observations. Note that if we 
do exclude observations within these NAICS codes our model results do not change. In 1997, the 
Census did not collect information on capital investment in computers. This is a critical 
component of our measure of establishment-level technology. Rather than drop all data in 1997, 
we impute the missing capital investment variable as a simple average of values in surrounding 
years, or by setting it equal to the same variable in the prior or subsequent year of our sample if 
only one other establishment level observation was available. Plants in operation in year t and 
t+5 that were not in operation in t+10 were defined as exits. Plants that remained in operation in 
t+10 are defined as incumbents. We identify two “spells” in our data. The first spell includes 
plants identified in 1992 that remain in operation in 1997. Our analysis explores whether these 
plants exited or not by 2002. Our second spell starts with plants in 1997 and that remain in 
operation in 2002. Analysis focuses on whether these plants exited by 2007. The overall plant 
exit rate between 1997 and 2002 and between 2002 and 2007 was approximately 27%. 
 
Table 3 displays the characteristics of incumbents and plant exits averaged over the two waves 
for which data are available. The differences reported are all statistically significant. In general, 
incumbent plants face lower import competition from both low-wage and high-wage countries, 
they have slightly higher TFP and computer investments, they are nearly twice as large as plants 
that exit, they exhibit higher levels of capital investment per worker and are slightly older. In 
addition, incumbent plants are significantly more likely to be exporters, to be part of a multi-unit 
firm and to have engaged in related-party trade with a foreign affiliate in a low-wage country.  
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4. Approach: Models of Plant Exit 
 
The models of exit developed in this section are driven by the differences in establishment 
characteristics reported in Table 3. The models presented are of panel-form, that is they comprise 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal components. These models are estimated for two waves 
over three time periods 1992, 1997 and 2002 and 1997, 2002 and 2007 for reasons discussed 
below. To the best of our knowledge, these panel models are the first that focus on U.S. import 
competition and that incorporate plant-level fixed effects. 
 
Most models linking imports to plant exit are essentially cross-sectional, taking plant, firm and 
industry characteristics in time period t and relating those to the probability of plant exit in the 
time step between time period t and t+1 (or t+5 in our case). While this specification is common, 
it does not take full advantage of all the possibilities in the data, particularly those that control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the plant level. An example of a missing variable that might have 
serious impacts on a cross-sectional model of exit is managerial expertise. Unfortunately, no 
information about the skills of managers is available in the data we have access to, but it is clear 
that managerial expertise is likely to impact a number of plant-specific control variables that 
reflect choices of business owners/managers. Left unaccounted for, this correlation violates a key 
assumption of exogeneity and may result in biased and inconsistent estimators (Wooldridge 
2002). We tackle this problem using a fixed effects panel model. With a binary dependent 
variable, an obvious choice in terms of estimation is the conditional logit model. Unfortunately, a 
lack of convergence in fixed effect panel logits estimated with maximum likelihood techniques 
meant that an alternative estimation strategy was required. In the end, we estimated our panel 
models of plant exit with the linear probability model. Use of the linear probability model (LPM) 
in settings where the dependent variable is binary raises some concerns. First, if LPM estimates 
fall outside the unit interval they are themselves likely to be biased and inconsistent. In the 
results we report below, this is not a problem. Second, LPM generates heteroscedasticity when 
the dependent variable is binary. To address this concern, all models are estimated using 
heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. It should be noted that use of the LPM in 
panel settings dampens the concerns just raised. Finally, our preliminary analysis with cross-
sectional logit models (not reported here) generated results similar to those already in the 
literature, and the results from our LPM panel models were qualitatively identical. We extend 
this discussion in Section 5. 
 
To estimate our panel model of exit requires three consecutive time periods. Rather than explore 
the relationship between plant characteristics at time period t and the probability of exit between 
t and t+5, analysis in panel mode accounts for the probability of plant exit over the period t+5 to 
t+10, using changes in plant characteristics taken from periods t and t+5. The four years of plant 
data thus constitute two waves in the panel model, the first covering the period 1992-2002 
inclusive and the second covering the period 1997-2007 inclusive.  
 
Building on models linking plant exit to import competition such as Bernard et al. (2006), Couke 
and Sleuwaegen (2008), Colantone et al. (2014), and the more general models of plant and firm 
exit (Dunne et al. 1989; Siegfried and Evans 1994; Baldwin and Gorecki 1998), we develop a 
composite econometric specification of manufacturing plant exit. Each wave of the panel takes 
the following form 
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where the ∆ operator signifies the one period (5-year) difference in the following variable or 
vector of variables. The terms 𝛿!, 𝛿! and 𝛿! represent industry, region and time-period fixed 
effects that are common to different dimensions of our panel data. These fixed effects are 
included in all model specifications. The dependent variable is binary, taking the value 0 for 
incumbents and 1 for establishments that exit. The vector P captures plant characteristics that 
change over the years t to t+5 including the value of shipments (our measure of plant-size), the 
capital-labor ratio, relative plant age, the computer share of plant investment, plant-level 
exporting activity, total factor productivity, and whether the plant switches industry codes 
between t and t+5. On the basis of the existing literature, we anticipate that older and larger 
plants, plants with higher levels of capital investment, particularly computer-related investment, 
plants with higher total factor productivity and plants that export should be less likely to exit. We 
expect that as plants alter the composition of their output and switch industries they will be less 
likely to exit. We augment these establishment variables with a vector of firm-level variables F 
that includes dummies indicating whether the plant is part of a multi-unit firm or part of a 
multinational firm that engages in related-party trade in a low-wage country. Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) suggest plants that are part of multi-unit firms have a higher probability of exit, along 
with plants that belong to U.S. multinational corporations. Finally, the key variable of interest is 
the LOW_WAGE_IMPCOMP, which captures industry-specific import competition from low-
wage countries. As an additional control, we include the equivalent measure for imports from 
high-wage countries (HIGH_WAGE_IMPCOMP). We expect import competition from low wage 
countries to increase the likelihood of plant exit. Across most models standard errors are 
clustered by NAICS sector to guard against within cluster error correlation. For some models 
with instrumental variables we also report results where standard errors are not clustered. In all 
cases, standard errors are robust. 
 
In the panel specification, the standard measure of plant age exhibits no cross-sectional variance 
over time since all plants age at the same pace. However, the difference between surviving from 
one period to the next for a plant that is only a year old and for a plant that is a decade old is not 
the same and we exploit this difference to capture the aging effect of plants on the probability of 
exit by measuring changes in relative plant age over time. The relative age of a plant is 
calculated by dividing the year t by the year of birth of the plant. Thus, in the year 2005 a plant 
born in 1950 has the relative age 2005/1950 = 1.028205. A plant born in 2000 has a relative age 
in 2005 equal to 2005/2000 = 1.0025. By 2010, the relative age of the plant born in 1950 has 
increased to 1.030769 and the relative age of the plant born in 2000 has increased to 1.005. Over 
the 5-year period between 2005 and 2010, the plant born in 1950 has aged in relative terms by 
1.030769-1.028205=0.002564 years. Over the same period, the plant born in 2000 has aged by 
1.005-1.0025=0.0025 years.  The older plant has aged faster in relative terms. We would 
anticipate a negative effect of aging in our exit models. Those plants that age faster (older plants) 
should have a lower probability of exiting than younger plants. This is indeed what we see in the 
results. 
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In contrast to some earlier models of plant/firm exit, we do not incorporate measures of skill-
intensity in our analysis. The primary reason for this is that such measures are unavailable and 
the proxy conventionally employed, the ratio of non-production to production workers, is very 
noisy. Concerns with use of this proxy are raised by Forbes (2001), Rigby and Breau (2008) and 
Ebenstein et al. (2009). We include a measure of the computer share of investment in our models 
and we anticipate that this variable will capture at least part of the influence of skill-intensity on 
plant exit. 
 
Note that manufacturing plants in the first wave of the panel that remain in production through at 
least 2002 are present in both waves of the panel. In a second sample for equation 2, plants 
present in both waves of the panel were removed to insure the independence of all observations. 
The results were qualitatively similar and are not shown for brevity.  
 
5. Results: Estimates of Plant Exit 
 
This section describes results from a series of models that estimate the relationship between low-
wage country import competition and plant exit. Table 4 presents our main results, with columns 
1 and 2 reporting results that incorporate plant-level characteristics only and column 3 adding 
firm-level characteristics to those models. Table 5 presents initial results from instrumental 
variables estimates as we explore the robustness of the base results. Tables 6 and 7 enrich our 
understanding of the relationships between plant/firm characteristics and exit by exploring 
several dimensions of plant/firm heterogeneity in the data. In Table 6 we focus on multi-plant 
firms and explore whether the least productive establishment within the firm is the most likely to 
exit. Table 7 explores interactions between import competition and a series of plant/firm 
characteristics. 
 
The essential relationship between low-wage country import competition and the likelihood of 
plant exit is explored in Table 4. Each column presents a slightly different model specification, 
fine-tuning our understanding of this relationship. We start with plant-level covariates only. 
Column one presents the most parsimonious model, reflecting the received understanding of 
import competition and plant exit. The key variable of interest is industry-specific low-wage 
country import competition. Increases in low-wage country import competition raise the 
likelihood of plant exit significantly, as expected. Import competition from high-wage countries 
also raises the probability of plant exit though the magnitude of this effect is much smaller. 
Consistent with much of the existing literature, including the work of Bernard et al. (2006), we 
report that larger plants, those that are older, that export, and that have higher investments in 
computing technology are less likely to exit. Higher levels of capital stock per worker had no 
significant influence on plant exit. Plants that switch industries, those that alter their mix of 
outputs perhaps in response to competitive pressure, are less likely to exit than are plants that 
remain in the same industry over time. Bernard et al. (2006) show, further, that switching plants 
adjust the composition of output their output to reduce their exposure to low-wage country 
imports. 
 
We omit a productivity measure from the specification of model 1 as we expect that our plant-
level controls should capture much of the variance in plant survival that an independent 
productivity term would sweep up. A measure of plant-level total factor productivity (TFP) is 
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added in model 2. Our intuition is not proved correct, for the TFP measure has an additional 
negative influence on the probability of plant-exit while leaving the influence of the other 
independent variables unchanged. Column 3 adds two firm-level controls to the model 
specification. First, a variable that captures the multi-plant status of firms shows that 
establishments that are part of multi-unit firms are more likely to exit than plants comprising 
single-unit firms. This finding is consistent with Bernard and Jensen (2007). Second, we add a 
flag indicating whether a plant is part of a firm that engages in related-party trade with an 
affiliate located in a low-wage country. Our intuition is that multi-national firms operating in 
low-wage countries can more readily offshore tasks that might duplicate the imports from low-
wage competitors and thus the plants of such firms should have a lower probability of exit. The 
results are consistent with this argument. Bernard and Jensen (2007) report that plant exit is 
higher for units of multi-national firms. Our results suggest that more work is required to 
characterize the nature of foreign affiliates and what role those affiliates might play in the 
strategies of multi-nationals. 
 
In Table 5 attention turns to simultaneity bias and the potential endogeneity of our measure of 
low-wage import competition. We instrument for this variable using estimates of import 
competition for European Union manufacturing sectors in similar fashion to Autor et al. (2012). 
In column 1 of Table 5 we show results of our non-instrumented model to facilitate comparison 
with the instrumental variables estimates that are displayed in columns 2 and 3 of the table. In 
the IV model results reported in column 2 standard errors are not clustered, while in the IV 
model results reported in column 3 standard errors are clustered by NAICS sectors. The first 
stage diagnostics from the instrumental variable regressions are reported at the bottom of the 
table. The Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM-statistics for the first-stage regressions reported in columns 2 
and 3 both lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced form coefficients is 
under-identified. The Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for weak instruments 
reported are both above the Stock-Yogo critical threshold of 10. The sharp decline in the value of 
the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for weak instruments in column 3 is a reflection of the use of 
clustered standard errors in this model, though the standard Stock-Yogo threshold is still passed. 
Unfortunately with only one instrumental variable, over-identification tests cannot be performed. 
We did attempt to employ a second instrument, an estimate of trade costs (see Bernard et al. 
2006) that we have successfully employed elsewhere (Kemeny et al. 2015). However, the trade-
cost instrument proved very weak either on its own or alongside the EU measure of import 
competition, failing first-stage F-tests, and so we abandoned use of this second instrument. 
 
In a qualitative sense, the results from the models where we instrument for low-wage import 
competition are virtually indistinguishable from those where we do not instrument. The signs and 
significance of the independent variables are consistent across both sets of models. However, the 
coefficients for our instrumented measure of low-wage import competition increase by about an 
order of magnitude over the non-instrumented model. In general, there are two primary concerns 
with IV estimates, that they are weak or that the standard exclusion restriction is invalid. As 
noted above, we pass the standard tests for weak instruments and the exclusion restriction cannot 
directly be tested. Again we might take some solace in our panel specification that reduces the 
likelihood that our instrument might be correlated with an omitted variable. It turns out, that 
Bernard et al. (2006) report similar findings in their analysis of plant exit, even though they use a 
quite different instrument. At this point, perhaps, we can safely agree that low-wage import 
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competition hastens plant exit, though the precise magnitude of that effect awaits further 
investigation. 
 
Next, we turn attention to further exploration of the role of plant heterogeneity in mediating the 
impact of low-wage country import competition on plant exit. Building on the findings in Table 
4, we expect that the increased likelihood of exit for plants that are part of a multi-unit firm is not 
distributed evenly across all establishments of a single firm. To explore this possibility we limit 
our analytical sample to plants that are part of multi-unit firms and we construct a dummy 
variable to identify the plant with the lowest productivity (TFP) within each firm. We 
hypothesize that the probability of exit for such plants should be higher than average. The results 
from re-estimating equation 2 for this restricted multi-unit firm sample are presented in Table 6.  
 
Estimating equation 2 using the linear probability model (LPM) and starting with plant-level 
controls only, column 1 presents a model that includes the flag for the lowest productivity plant, 
but no overall TFP measure. Column 2 presents the same model, but includes our measure of 
plant productivity (TFP). Column 3 adds the remaining firm-level variable, related party trade in 
a low-wage country. In all these models there is strong consistency in the results. Low-wage 
country import competition remains positive and significant, raising the likelihood of plant exit. 
While estimates of the coefficients on our control variables are broadly consistent with the 
results already presented, the coefficient that captures switching plants, those that alter their 
product mix and change industries, reverses sign in these models. Thus, switching plants are 
more likely to exit than are than non-switching plants in our multi-unit firm sample. The 
significance of this relationship disappears in the IV models of Table 6 (columns 4 and 5), that 
otherwise tell a markedly consistent story. Of most interest in Table 6, and consistent across all 
specifications, is the result for the dummy indicating the least productive plant within each firm. 
In all cases, the coefficient on the dummy is positive and significant at the one percent level. 
This result is consistent with the idea that as firms face increasing import competition (in some 
or all of their activities), multi-unit firms respond by closing their least productive sites, shifting 
attention and resources to other parts of the firm. This reallocation of resources between plants 
within the multi-unit firm is consistent with the findings of Bloom et al. (2011) on between firm 
shifts in Europe. 
 
Finally we turn our attention to a series of interactions, in which we explore how our main 
relationship of interest – between plant exit and changes in low wage import competition – may 
itself depend on a host of other plant characteristics. Taking the example of total factor 
productivity, we are interested in describing whether the odds of trade-induced plant exit vary 
according to a plant’s productivity. We explore such interactions for individual variables and for 
all variables together. If a variable yielded no significant interaction and was unchanged in its 
individual effect it was not interacted with import competition in the results shown in Table 7. 
This was the case for firm-size, related party trade in a low-wage country and the computer share 
of investment. The other variables were interacted with low-wage import competition. Table 7 
presents three models of such interactions, the first (column 1) ignoring concerns with 
endogeneity and the next two (columns 2 and 3) incorporating our instrument for low-wage 
import competition. In the latter case, the instruments for the interaction terms were built as the 
product of the original independent variables and the EU import competition instrument. 
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Column 1 of Table 7 reports results of our standard model with interactions between plant and 
firm characteristics, without instrumenting for low-wage import competition. In non-interacted 
form, the independent variables behave as previously reported, save for the influence of the 
capital-labor ratio that now becomes significant, though only at the 0.1 level. As we examine the 
interactions in column 1, we start with those plant and firm variables that are categorical. First, 
the results show that whether or not plants switch industries, differences in the probability of exit 
linked to increasing low-wage import competition are not significant. Second, plants that are part 
of multi-unit firms have exit probabilities that rise faster than those for single-plant firms when 
import competition from low-wage countries increases. Third, plants that export face smaller 
increases in the probability of exit than non-exporting plants as import competition intensifies. 
Turning to the continuous variable interactions, the change in the probability of plant exit with 
increased low-wage import competition is significantly lower for more productive plants than it 
is for less productive plants. Variations in capital-labor ratios across plants have no significant 
influence on changes in the probability of exit as low-wage import competition increases. 
 
Shifting to columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 we incorporate instrumental variables in these interaction 
models. Once more our models pass the standard tests for identification and weak instruments. 
Results for the interactions between exporting plants and import competition and between plant 
productivity levels and import competition do not change. However, for all other interactions 
there are important differences between the instrumented and non-instrumented model results. 
Perhaps most importantly, after instrumenting, we see that the change in the probability of exit 
induced by higher levels of low-wage import competition is smaller for plants that are part of 
multi-unit firms than for single-plant firms. In similar fashion, the interaction model shows that 
there are significant differences in the partial regression slope coefficients for the impact of low-
wage import competition on plant exit for plants that do or do not switch industries and for plants 
with different capital-labor ratios. These results are consistent across the models whether 
standard errors are clustered or not. Overall, the findings in Table 7 suggest that heterogeneity 
between manufacturing establishments has a more complex impact on the relationship between 
low-wage import competition and plant exit than previously thought. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Building on a resurgence of interest on the labor market impacts of international trade in high-
wage countries, this paper examines how import competition from low-wage countries 
influences manufacturing plant exit in the United States. To do this, we combine U.S. 
manufacturing plant-level data spanning the period 1992-2007 with firm-level data and with 
measures of low-wage import competition by detailed industry group. We report results from a 
series of linear probability models estimated in fixed effects panel form. Our core specification 
adopts a three period panel that allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant 
level in our models of plant exit. This represents a significant advance over existing models of 
trade competition and exit. We update past estimates of low-wage country import competition 
and plant exit and we extend those models to explore the influence of different forms of plant 
and firm heterogeneity on the likelihood of plant closure. An instrumental variables approach is 
employed to examine whether or not the core results are robust to concerns regarding 
endogeneity. 
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Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant level in a series of linear probability 
models estimated over two three-year panels (1992-1997-2002 and 1997-2002-2007) we 
generate a series of results that are broadly consistent with existing research, notably that of 
Bernard et al. (2006). Plant-size and relative plant age are inversely related to the probability of 
exit. Manufacturing plants that are more capital-intensive and that direct higher shares of capital 
investment into computing technology are also less likely to exit. These effects are statistically 
significant. We found no influence of the capital to labor ratio within plants on the probability of 
establishment closure. Plants with higher total factor productivity were significantly more 
resistant to exit. We also find that manufacturing plants that alter the product composition of 
their output such that they are reclassified from one 6-digit NAICS class to another are less likely 
to exit. This finding supports earlier work that suggests product switching is a strategic response 
to import competition from low-wage countries. Turning to trade, across all models, rising 
import competition is positively associated with plant exit. This effect is always statistically 
significant. We build measures of import competition from low-wage countries and high-wage 
countries. Including both measures in our models, the influence of low-wage import competition 
on establishment closure is always more than two orders of magnitude greater than the influence 
of high-wage import competition. 
 
As we add firm-level characteristics to our models we update and confirm some of the findings 
of Bernard and Jensen (2007) while extending the analysis and making it robust to unobserved 
plant-level heterogeneity. Our results show that plants which are part of multi-unit firms have 
significantly higher probabilities of exit than single-plant firms. Further, we use an instrumental 
variables approach to show that this effect is robust to concerns regarding the endogeneity of our 
measure of low-wage import competition. While Bernard and Jensen (2007) also report that 
plants belonging to multi-national firms have a higher probability of exit than plants which are 
not affiliated with multi-national firms, we show that if a plant is part of a firm that engages in 
related-party trade with a foreign affiliate in a low-wage country then the plant has a lower 
probability of exit than one that is not part of a firm engaged in the same trade relationship. We 
suspect that multi-national firms operating in low-wage countries can more readily offshore tasks 
that might duplicate the imports from low-wage competitors and thus the plants of such firms are 
to some degree inured from such competition. The geography of firm-level related-party 
affiliations matters for plant exit. 
 
Exploring various dimensions of plant heterogeneity in our data, we are also able to show that 
the least productive plants in multi-plant firms are the most likely establishments to be forced 
from the market. Further, low-wage country import competition interacts significantly with a 
number of plant-level and firm-level characteristics that shape the probability of manufacturing 
plant exit. In particular, establishments that are part of multi-unit firms have exit probabilities 
that rise faster than those for single-plant firms when import competition from low-wage 
countries increases. At the same time, plants that export and more productive plants face smaller 
increases in the probability of exit than non-exporting plants less productive units as import 
competition intensifies. Finally, we find that the change in the probability of exit induced by 
higher levels of low-wage import competition is smaller for plants that are part of multi-unit 
firms than for single-plant firms. These explorations of establishment heterogeneity suggest a lot 
more analysis is necessary to understand the linkages between the strategic decisions of different 
kinds of plants and firms and the nature of trade-based competition. 
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Concern with the potential endogeneity of our measure of low-wage import competition in the 
U.S. prompted us to utilize an instrumental variables approach. As an instrument, we used low-
wage import competition for a number of European Union countries. Estimating panel models 
using instrumental variables (IV) approaches had no qualitative impact on our core results, 
though IV estimates of the partial regression coefficient linking import competition to plant exit 
increased roughly by an order of magnitude over the OLS results. This mirrors the earlier 
analysis of Bernard et al. (2006). Additional research is clearly required to provide more precise 
and robust point estimates of the impact of foreign competition on manufacturing plant death. 
 
Finally, it is clear from Autor et al. (2012) and Rigby et al. (2014) that Chinese exports have 
been the primary driver of the rise in U.S. import competition originating from low-wage 
countries over the last two decades or so. Whether imports from China are of a fundamentally 
different character than imports from other low-wage countries is a matter of some debate (Mion 
and Zhu 2013). Clearly, separating imports from different countries, low-wage and high-wage, 
and examining their individual impact on the U.S. economy would be of considerable interest. 
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Table 1: List of Low-Wage Countries, World Bank 1992 
Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Benin  Burkina Faso Burundi 
Cambodia Central African 
Republic 
Chad China Comoros Congo  
 
Egypt Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras India Indonesia 
Kenya Laos Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi 
Maldives Mali Mauritania Mozambique Myanmar Nepal 
Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Sao Tome Sierra Leone 
Solomon Is. Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Tanzania Togo 
Uganda Vietnam Zambia    
 
 
  
 24 
Table 2: Low-Wage Country Import Competition 
NAICS Manufacturing Industry                        LWC Import Competition 
   1992            1997          2002             2007 
311 Food 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.1 
312 Beverage & Tobacco 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
313 Textile Mills 3.2 3.5 5.2 8.5 
314 Textile Products 8.6 7.7 14.1 32.8 
315 Apparel 16.4 21.0 28.2 57.5 
316 Leather 28.2 42.3 58.4 70.3 
321 Wood 1.7 1.6 2.1 3.8 
322 Paper 0.2 0.4 0.9 2.1 
323 Printing & Related 2.2 1.7 5.3 14.2 
324 Petroleum & Coal 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.6 
325 Chemicals 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.8 
326 Plastics & Rubber 0.8 1.6 2.8 6.1 
327 Non-Metallic Minerals 1.4 2.6 4.5 6.3 
331 Primary Metals 0.6 0.8 1.4 3.8 
332 Fabricated Metals 1.1 1.6 3.5 6.9 
333 Machinery 0.6 1.4 2.8 6.4 
334 Computer & Elec 2.1 3.6 9.3 23.1 
335 Electrical Equipment 2.9 5.3 10.1 16.5 
336 Transport Equipment 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.7 
337 Furniture 1.5 4.0 11.1 19.9 
339 Miscellaneous 10.5 14.4 17.7 26.0 
Notes: LWC Import Competition measures are shown as percentages. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Manufacturing Plants (Exit and Incumbents, all years) 
Variable Incumbents Exits t-statistic 
Low-Wage Import Competition 
 
0.027 
(0.000) 
0.035 
(0.000) 
-18.517 
High-Wage Import Competition 
 
0.131 
(0.005) 
0.171 
(0.013) 
-2.907 
Log of Total Factor Productivity 1.987 
(0.002) 
1.942 
(0.003) 
14.468 
Computer Share of Investment 0.108 
(0.001) 
0.089 
(0.001) 
20.402 
Industry Switcher 0.132 
(0.001) 
0.125 
(0.002) 
3.838 
Value of Shipments 24978 
(441) 
14217 
(483) 
16.451 
Capital-Labor Ratio 79.387 
(0.653) 
68.015 
(2.094) 
5.184 
Relative Age 1.008 
(0.000) 
1.007 
(0.000) 
28.703 
Exports Dummy 0.283 
(0.001) 
0.182 
(0.002) 
44.824 
Multi-Unit Dummy 0.340 
(0.001) 
0.315 
(0.002) 
9.563 
Low-Wage Country Related Party Trade 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
8.567 
Notes: The terms in parentheses represent standard errors. t-statistics were obtained through ANOVA with year 
fixed effects. All values refer to means for the two plant types. LOW_WAGE_IMPCOMP is the measure of low-
wage country import competition for the industry in which the plant is located, HIGH_WAGE_IMPCOMP is the 
equivalent measure of import competition but from high-wage countries, LN(TFP) is a plant specific estimate of 
TFP, COMPUTER_SHARE represents the share of investments devoted to computers and related equipment, 
IND_SWITCHER is a dummy variable marking whether a plant switched NAICS industry codes between period t 
and period t+5, TVS is the total value of shipments, KL is the capital-labor ratio, RELATIVE_AGE is a measure of 
plant age (year/plant birth year), EXPORTS_DUMMY indicates whether the plant had non-zero exports, 
MULTI_UNIT refers to the share of plants that belong to a multi-unit firm, LOW_WAGE_RELATED_TRADE 
denotes whether the plant is part of multi-national firm trading  with a foreign affiliate located in a low-wage 
country. 
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Table 4: Low-Wage Import Competition and Plant Exit, Panel Estimation: Linear 
Probability Models (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Plant-level controls only Firm-controls 
Variable No TFP With TFP 
 Low-Wage  Import Competition 0.2865** 0.2813** 0.2854** 
 
(0.1141) (0.1139) (0.1139) 
High-Wage Import Competition 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Computer Share of Investment -0.2136*** -0.2135*** -0.2137*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Industry Switcher -0.0347*** -0.0341*** -0.0344*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Value of Shipments -1.48e-07*** -1.41e-07*** -1.41e-07*** 
 
(4.14e-08) (3.91e-08) (3.89e-08) 
Capital-Labor Ratio -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Relative Age -2,813.71*** -2,823.79*** -2,811.45*** 
 
(256.5) (255.3) (255.7) 
Exports Dummy -0.0333*** -0.0324*** -0.0323*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Log TFP 
 
-0.0253*** -0.0253*** 
  
(0.0042) (0.0042) 
Multi-Unit Dummy 
  
0.0172** 
   
(0.0087) 
Low-Wage Country Related Party 
Trade 
  
-0.049*** 
   
  
(0.0103) 
Observations 330000 330000 330000 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Notes: Numbers of observations have been rounded to protect confidentiality of respondents. All models include 
industry, region and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by NAICS. * 
indicates significance at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5: Low-Wage Import Competition and Plant Exit Panel Estimation: Instrumental 
Variables (IV) Approach 
		 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
OLS - without high-
wage impcomp 
IV - no 
clustering IV - cluster by NAICS 
Low-Wage Import Competition 0.2871** 2.9103*** 2.9103*** 
  (0.1138) (0.2123) (1.0442) 
Computer Share of Investment -0.2138*** -0.2027*** -0.2027*** 
   (0.0162) (0.0108) (0.0150) 
Industry Switcher -0.0344*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0100) 
Value of Shipments -1.41e-07*** -1.14e-07*** -1.14e-07*** 
 
(3.89e-08) (2.74e-08) (4.28e-08) 
Capital-Labor Ratio -0.00001 -5.53e-06 -5.53e-06 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Relative Age -2,809.81*** -2,296.37*** -2,296.37*** 
 
(255.6) (212.7) (320.3) 
Exports Dummy -0.0324*** -0.0302*** -0.0302*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0042) 
Log TFP -0.0253*** -0.0291*** -0.0291*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0060) 
Multi-Unit Dummy 0.0172** 0.0209** 0.0209** 
 
(0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0103) 
Low-Wage Country Related Party Trade -0.0488*** -0.0627*** -0.0627*** 
   (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0123) 
Observations 330000 130000 130000 
R-squared 0.26 - - 
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM statistic - 1701.9 15.5 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic - 5581.5 5581.5 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic - 1713.9 13.6 
Notes: Numbers of observations have been rounded to protect confidentiality of respondents. All models include 
industry, region and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. * indicates significance at the 0.1 level, ** at the 
0.05 level and *** at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 6: Low-Wage Import Competition and Plant Exit Panel Estimation: Lowest 
Productivity Plants within Multi-Unit firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable 
LPM -     
Without TFP 
LPM -          
With TFP 
LPM -         
LDC Related 
Party Trade 
IV - no 
clustering 
IV - cluster by 
NAICS 
Low-Wage  0.6403*** 0.6379*** 0.6479*** 2.664*** 2.664*** 
  Import Competition  
 
(0.1420) (0.1402) (0.1398) (0.3446) (0.8163) 
Lowest Productivity 0.0385*** 0.0358*** 0.0357*** 0.0276*** 0.0276*** 
  Plant in Firm 
 
(0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0068) 
High-Wage  0.0019*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
    Import Competition  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
  Computer Share  -0.0516*** -0.0505*** -0.0503*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
  of Investment (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0202) 
 
Industry Switcher 0.0236*** 0.0235*** 0.0231*** 0.0135 0.0135 
 
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0095) (0.0083) 
 
Value of Shipments -1.13e-07*** -1.06e-07*** -1.06e-07*** -8.71e-08*** -8.71e-08** 
 
(3.45e-08) (3.20e-08) (3.18e-08) (2.79e-08) (3.68e-08) 
 
Capital-Labor  Ratio -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00002* -0.00002* 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
 
Relative Age -1,447.87*** -1,463.56*** -1,461.00*** -1,335.08*** -1,335.08*** 
 
(365.5) (366.9) (366.3) (339.6) (425.3) 
 
Exports Dummy -0.0307*** -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0294*** -0.0294*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0058) 
 
Log TFP 
 
-0.0267*** -0.0267*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0069) 
 
Low-Wage Country 
  
-0.0412*** -0.0528*** -0.0528*** 
  Related Party Trade  (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0129) 
 
Observations 105000 105000 105000 47000 47000 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 - - 
K-P rk LM statistic    499.3 13.8 
C-D Wald F statistic - - - 2596.5 2596.5 
K-P Wald F statistic - - - 588.2 13.7 
Notes: Numbers of observations have been rounded to protect the confidentiality of respondents. All models include 
industry, region and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Except where noted (Model 4) standard errors are 
clustered by NAICS. * indicates significance at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level and *** at the 0.01 level. K-P is 
Kleinbergen-Paap and C-D is Cragg-Donald. LPM stands for Linear Probability Model; IV stands for Instrumental 
Variables. 
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Table 7: Low-Wage Import Competition and Plant Exit, Panel Estimation: Interactions 
with Low-Wage Import Competition 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
LPM - Multiple 
Interactions 
IV - Without 
Clustering IV - Cluster by NAICS 
Low-Wage Import Competition 0.6969*** 8.7804*** 8.7804*** 
  (0.1587) (0.7149) (2.2730) 
High-Wage Import Competition 0.0019*** 
    (0.0004) 
  Computer Share of Investment -0.2132*** -0.2023*** -0.2023*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0153) 
Industry Switcher -0.0354*** 0.0058 0.0058 
 
(0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0092) 
Value of Shipments -1.41e-07*** -1.30e-07*** -1.30e-07*** 
 
(3.90e-08) (2.95e-08) (4.86e-08) 
Capital-Labor Ratio -0.00002* -0.00002 -0.00002 
 
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003) 
Relative Age -2,805.69*** -2,210.96*** -2,210.96*** 
 
(254.2) (220.8) (308.4) 
Exports Dummy -0.0268*** -0.0176*** -0.0176*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0055) 
Log TFP -0.0188*** 0.0892*** 0.0892*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0105) (0.0321) 
Multi-Unit Dummy 0.0113 0.0541*** 0.0541*** 
 
-0.0087 (0.0102) (0.0133) 
Low-Wage Related Party Trade -0.0499*** -0.0492*** -0.0492*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0115) (0.0129) 
Low-Wage Impcomp*Log TFP -0.2436*** -3.1975*** -3.1975*** 
 
(0.0701) (0.2761) (0.8406) 
Low-Wage Impcomp* Ind. Switcher 0.0441 -0.5464*** -0.5464*** 
    (0.0642) (0.1380) (0.1853) 
Low-Wage Impcomp* K/L 0.0005 -0.0028*** -0.0028* 
 
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
Low-Wage Impcomp*Multi-Unit 0.2441*** -1.0502*** -1.0502*** 
    (0.0835) (0.1668) (0.3945) 
Low-Wage Impcomp*Exports Dummy -0.189*** -0.3003*** -0.3003*** 
    (0.0456) (0.0826) (0.0917) 
Observations 330000 130000 130000 
R-squared 0.26 - - 
K-P rk LM statistic  389.6 20.0 
C-D Wald F statistic - 2637.6 2637.6 
K-P Wald F statistic - 480.9 20.1 
Notes: Numbers of observations have been rounded to protect confidentiality of respondents. All models include 
industry, region and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Except where noted (Model 2) standard errors are 
clustered by NAICS. * indicates significance at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level and *** at the 0.01 level. K-P is 
Kleinbergen-Paap and C-D is Cragg-Donald. LPM stands for Linear Probability Model; IV stands for Instrumental 
Variables. 
 
